Introduction
Whether a country with supernormal economic growth prospects but with underdeveloped financial markets can deflect the rising demand for its currency and for unrestricted entry into its domestic capital markets by creating a highly-regulated offshore center for its currency is currently being put to the test in Hong Kong. The yuan denominated bond market in Hong Kong, also known as the Dim Sum bond market or the Renminbi (RMB) 1 bond market, enables nonresidents of China -who are usually barred 2 from participating in China's onshore bond markets,-to invest in yuan-denominated bonds, issued by a select group of pre-screened entities and financial institutions, outside of China. This bond market, which allows accumulated offshore yuans to flow back into the Mainland under strict regulatory controls, was initiated in 2007 as part of China's multi-faceted plan to begin internationalizing the yuan, launch a platform that would enable China to leverage Hong Kong's superior financial infrastructure (Chen and Cheung, 2011; Fung and Yau, 2012) and gradually liberalize its capital account (Eichengreen, 2010) .
China is relying on Hong Kong's relatively superior financial infrastructure to develop its offshore capital market which will eventually be fully integrated with its domestic financial markets in the Mainland.
In recent years, large amounts of Chinese yuans have moved offshore as China implemented a sequence of measures to liberalize its current account and encourage settlements with its trading partners in yuans instead of the U.S. dollar (Sekine, 2011) . Specifically, as (a) proportionately more bilateral trades between China and its Asian and Latin American trading partners have been transacted in yuans instead of U.S. dollars, (b) China invested in infrastructure projects around Asia, Latin America and Africa through its sovereign wealth funds, and (c) Mainland Chinese tourists spent record amounts of 1 The Renminbi, known in its abbreviated form as RMB, is the official currency of the Peoples Republic of China but not of Hong Kong or Macau. The supply of RMB is determined entirely by monetary authorities in China. Like the Federal Reserve in the United States, which determines the supply of U.S. dollars to the global economy, it is the Peoples Bank of China that determines and controls the supply of RMBs; yuan is the unit of account.
yuans abroad, mainly in Hong Kong, the amount of offshore yuans seeking investable outlets have increased steeply over the years.
China has the unique advantage of being a nation with two systems: the relatively restrictive, government-controlled regime in the Mainland and the free, market-based economic environment in Hong Kong. Even though it lacks at the moment the financial sophistication in the Mainland to permit full and unrestricted internationalization of its currency, China can utilize the platforms in Hong Kong to phase in its financial strategies gradually, thereby affording for itself time to upgrade the financial systems in the Mainland.
China has allowed increasing numbers of entities to issue bonds in the Dim Sum bond market and officially move the offshore RMBs onshore via enhanced channels. China appears to be supplying the world with increasing amounts of offshore yuans on the one hand and creating on the other enhanced mechanisms of entry, albeit regulated, for these offshore yuans into the Mainland..
Yet, the Dim Sum market remains small in its capacity to absorb all the yuans that have moved offshore due to enhanced trade settlements in yuans. It is small not because holders of RMBs are using other channels to move money onshore. It is small because the number of institutions issuing bonds in this market is not expanding as expected. The prevalence of strict oversight as to how the offshore RMBs can flow back into the mainland is discouraging major institutions and corporations from issuing longer term bonds on a large scale in the Dim Sum bond market.
The object of our study is to evaluate the performance of the Dim Sum bond market since its inception, both in absolute terms and in relation to the measures that have been taken to promote the market and generate international interest in RMB bonds via the platform in Hong Kong. Despite being a smaller market for bonds than in the Mainland, the Hong Kong bond market for RMB bonds was projected to be the preeminent offshore center for the Chinese currency and RMB bonds. Whether Hong Kong has fulfilled its intended role as the center for RMB bonds to date will be explored in our study.
We find that even though the Dim Sum bond market has grown appreciably since its inception in 2007 and is expected to surpass the critical threshold of $25 billion in 2013, the market is not absorbing an increasing proportion of the RMB deposits which have accumulated in Hong Kong on account of enhanced levels of trade settlements in RMBs and RMB spending in Hong Kong. The ratio of RMB bonds to RMB deposits in Hong Kong was the same in 2012 as it was in 2009. On the other hand, RMB holders have shown a preference for time deposits in Hong Kong, which have been growing at a much faster pace since 2007. Also, the majority of issues in the Dim Sum bond market have maturities less than five years. Even though investors were willing in the past to accept lower yields in anticipation of currency related gains when the yuan appreciated, they have demanded since December 2012 higher yields and rated bonds on the Dim Sum market as the expectation that the yuan can only move up has weakened substantially. The expectation that the yuan can fluctuate is eventually good for the Dim Sum bond market since nobody would like to borrow in a currency that will only appreciate with time.
We review in section 2 the economic and environmental circumstances that prompted Chinese authorities to inaugurate the Dim Sum bond market in Hong Kong. We provide a detailed review of the RMB bond market, emphasizing (a) the origins of the RMB bond market in Hong Kong, and (b) the drivers of current and future growth in the RMB bond market. (Shim, 2012) .
In particular, rising global demand for Asian bonds, increasing bond issuance in ASEAN countries, enhanced foreign participation in Asian local currency bond markets amidst declining preference for G3 4 bonds, and greater share of bonds vis-à-vis stocks in global portfolios were the principal forces driving the growth in Asian bond market (Eichengreen, 2006 . China is slowly but steadily displacing the United States as a major trading partner of ASEAN nations. In addition to providing trading privileges to the member nations, CAFTA is committed to imparting a fair investment mechanism for investors from both sides.
Chinese companies investing in ASEAN countries can also enjoy most favored nation (MFN) treatment.
In addition, China is investing in infrastructure projects in Africa and Latin America and providing infrastructure assistance to developing and emerging economies using RMBs as the transaction medium.
Such practices will allow greater migration of RMBs out of Mainland China and these financial innovations will have benevolent consequences for the RMB bond market in Hong Kong as more offshore yuans migrate to Hong Kong. RMB deposits in Hong Kong are expected to grow to a level of On the other hand, there are other forces which fuel the accumulation of RMB deposits in Hong
Kong. Exporters to China who received settlement in RMB and merchants in Hong Kong who are recipients of tourism-related RMBs tend to keep the RMB offshore and not return to the onshore banks.
Such tendencies resulted in offshore banks overshooting their quotas for RMB transactions unrelated to trade very quickly and the deposits in Hong Kong rising very rapidly.
While HKMA responded to this trend by raising the quota for RMB transactions for offshore banks in Hong Kong, Mainland Chinese authorities allowed more companies in China to settle exports and imports in RMB, adding only to the buildup of RMBs offshore which were gradually being reflected in the burgeoning RMB deposits in Hong Kong. While the Dim Sum bonds provided an outlet for these deposits to a degree, the major destination of these flows were time deposits with banks in Hong Kong.
China has limited the number of offshore access points to onshore markets with active deliberation and has entrusted Hong Kong to develop, promote and extend the RMB business globally. In effect, China is conducting a controlled experiment through Hong Kong, which is a reputed international financial center capable of ushering in financial innovation and tapping international capital markets for the ultimate benefit of China. The HKMA has world-class clearing and settlement systems already in place and is in a position to deal with an expanded set of RMB products.
For the foreseeable future, it would seem that all RMB flows into and out of China will be governed by a quota system or a case-by-case regulatory approval. The quotas may be periodically raised to match demand to a degree but it is readily evident that China would maintain the quota system as it liberalizes its capital account gradually over the years. Authorities in China have signaled that full convertibility of the RMB will be phased in gradually and expansion of the RMB market will be attempted with controls in place. Full convertibility of the RMB is not a necessary condition at the moment for the RMB market to grow but there will come a time the absence of full convertibility will hinder the growth of the RMB market. The Dim Sum bond market is case in point. If this market is to attract foreign issuers intent on raising RMBs that can be used to finance their expansions in Mainland China, the offshore RMB will have to be fully convertible to onshore RMBs. In addition to comparing liquidity, spread and pricing, foreign issuers will also consider the ease with which RMBs raised offshore can be repatriated to onshore. Despite recent relaxations, several restrictions still remain in force. by the end of 2012. Evidently, the RMB deposit base in Hong Kong has grown at a rapid rate and the 7 The reforms of October 2011 have made repatriation of offshore funds easier but authorities in China still insist on retaining both regulatory and supervisory powers over fund flows into the Mainland over a statutory limit. China announced its policies with regard to RMB FDI effective October 13, 2011, expanding on its policies for U.S. dollar FDI flows already in place. Any application for RMB FDI valued at or above RMB 300 million ($47 million) must be submitted to the Ministry of Commerce for prior approval. Amounts below RMB 300 million need not be. FDI investments in securities and derivatives investments are still prohibited but foreign investors are allowed to participate in private placements of publicly listed companies subject to approval by the Ministry of Commerce. RMB funds for M&A activities will have to be approved by the Ministry of Commerce. These actions open up new channels of flow for offshore RMB into onshore in many ways and bode well for the offshore RMB market.
RMB bond market has been able to absorb only a small fraction of the RMBs circulating in Hong Kong. With the entry of Chinese companies to the Dim Sum bond market in October 2011, the growth in this market is expected surpass prior records. The maturity of issues has lengthened from 2 to 3 years to 10 years in 2010 but the maturity for majority of bond issues in the Dim Sum market is less than three years (Fung and Yau, 2012) . According to data compiled from Thomson One, investors are demanding more rated bonds than ever before and the yields on Dim Sum bonds since December 2012 have risen since the expectation that the yuan will only rise in the future has weakened substantially since the beginning of 2013. Cross border trade in Renminbi was initiated in Hong Kong in September 2010. As of June 2013, total remittance of the Renminbi for cross border trade purposes has expanded by 870 percent and amounted to $43.75 billion, which is far less than the total RMB deposits in Hong Kong ($112.76 billion).
Holders of RMBs in
Thus, it is likely that offshore RMBs from places other than Hong Kong are moving to Hong Kong.
Offshore RMBs can either be held as deposits in Hong Kong, invested in Dim Sum bonds, repatriated onshore through regular channels, extended as loans to entities onshore or swapped into other currencies.
The size of the RMB deposit base in Hong Kong, in relation to the cross border trade settlement amount, China with less capital and within a shorter time frame. Given the fact that Hong Kong has one of the highest concentration of large banking institutions in the world (Garcia-Herrero, 2011), it is reasonable to expect that more banks will move into Hong Kong in order to have easier access to Mainland China in the future. As a matter of policy, China will first promote polices which will allow the RMB to be first regionalized before it can be truly internationalized. Hong Kong will play a pivotal role in the regionalization process and there is much to be gained in being in Hong Kong before investing opportunities are opened up in the Mainland.
The Dim Sum bond market has been compared with the Japanese Euro Yen bond market that evolved to allow foreigners to finance Japan's corporate growth in the 1980s amidst rising pressures on Japan to revalue its currency (Koo, 2003) . China today is in a similar state Japan was in the 1980s.
Foreigners would like to invest in China's growth but China would like to maintain strict administrative have. In fact, the bond market in Hong Kong, contrary to general beliefs, is presently not so active a market that it would be expected to stimulate the demand for Dim Sum bonds by virtue of its own inherent momentum. Not only is the market small compared to that of Mainland China's, the need for long term financing in Hong Kong barely goes beyond five years (Latter 2008) . The residents of Hong
Kong have a distinct, dichotomous preference function: they prefer either the banking market or the stock market. The majority of the demand for long term bonds comes from property developers, whose projects are usually completed within the five year time frame. Overall interest in bonds in Hong Kong, both from issuers and investors, is moderate at best (Latter 2008) . Multinational corporations and financial institutions will prefer to have the privilege of issuing securities in the Mainland rather than in Hong
Kong and there indeed might be a demand for such securities in the Mainland. The Chinese authorities understand this motivation all too well and yet they continue to liberalize gradually the markets in Hong
Kong and delay the opening the markets in the Mainland to foreign competition.
The internationalization of a currency is a gradual process and a currency is internationalized only after it has been regionalized to a certain degree. In that respect, the structure and dynamics of the Dim Sum bond market will be carefully watched by global investors and the ultimate test of its success will be determined by the market's ability to attract foreign investors and issuers alike. Hong Kong has played a pivotal role in promoting the Dim Sum bond market. But China's recent moves to begin offshore centers in Taiwan, Singapore and London and the issuances of RMB denominated bonds in each of these three regions in 2013 point to a motive to diversify the strategy with regard to promoting the RMB as an international currency. Hong Kong no longer enjoys the unique status of being the only place where RMB bonds are issued. In the ultimate analysis, the offshore market in Hong Kong will be integrated with the Mainland markets; the markets in Taiwan, Singapore and London will not be. Thus, there are natural limits to the extent Hong Kong can grow as an independent offshore center for Dim Sum bonds and eventually the Chinese yuan. Measures introduced to refine Hong Kong's offshore RMB business January 13, 2011 Domestic companies can move Renminbi offshore for investment purposes. Chinese companies can use yuan to buy foreign assets January 13, 2011
Shanghai will make it easier for foreigners to invest in the private equity sector January 13, 2011
Overseas sovereign wealth funds, pension funds, insurance companies and funds of funds will be able to directly invest in Chinese companies January, 2011
Pilot scheme for settlement of Mainland's overseas direct investment in Renminbi launched. Chinese companies can now take funds out of China for M&A. August 17, 2011
China endorsed the long-awaited mini-QFII and indicated that an initial quota of $3.1 billion would be shared among Hong Kong subsidiaries of Chinese securities companies and fund houses to allow them to invest directly into the mainland's securities market. Chinese firms will also be allowed to buy into an ETF linked to Hong Kong stocks. Mainland Chinese companies were given the official go-ahead with regard to issuing offshore Renminbi bonds in Hong Kong. Earlier, only mainland financial institutions and overseas companies were able to issue
October 13, 2011 China finalized and published its rules allowing RMB FDI effective October 13, expanding on its policies for U.S. dollar FDI flows already in place. Any application for RMB FDI valued at or above RMB 300 million ($47 million) must be submitted to the Ministry of Commerce for prior approval. Amounts below RMB 300 million need not be. FDI investments in securities and derivatives investments are still prohibited but foreign investors are allowed to participate in private placements of publicly listed companies subject to approval by the Ministry of Commerce. RMB funds for M&A activities will have to be approved by the Ministry of Commerce. These actions open up new channels of flow for offshore RMB into onshore in many ways and bode well for the offshore RMB market. June 14, 2012
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) announced a facility for providing Renminbi (RMB) liquidity to Authorized Institutions participating in RMB business (Participating AIs) in Hong Kong. The facility will make use of the currency swap arrangement between the People's Bank of China and the HKMA. With effect from 15 June 2012, the HKMA will, in response to requests from individual Participating AIs, provide RMB term funds to the Participating AIs against eligible collateral acceptable to the HKMA. The introduction of the facility is to support the continuous deepening of the RMB capital market in Hong Kong and to reinforce Hong Kong's role as the global hub for offshore RMB business. October 11, 2012 PBoC announced that a RMB clearing bank will be set up in Taiwan. This will consolidate Taiwan's position to be the second key offshore RMB center behind Hong Kong but ahead of London and Singapore. Bank of China (Hong King) became Hong Kong's RMB clearing bank in 2003. It could lead to the second offshore Chinese currency CNT -as opposed to CNH in Hong Kong. January 28, 2013
The Central bank of Taiwan (CBC) approved Bank of China (Taipei) as the
